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NOTES
ACCELERATION AND PREPAYMENT DISCLOSURES
UNDER TRUTH IN LENDING: NEMESIS OF
THE RULE OF 78'S?
I. INTRODUCTION
The amount of credit extended in the United States increased
tenfold in the quarter century after 1939.1 As industry more
rapidly transformed natural resources into consumer goods, more stable
jobs were created, and lenders and sellers more willingly extended
unsecured credit to consumers.2 Although state legislatures expressed
their concern with unfair credit practices by enacting usury statutes, 3
I. The following tables illustrate the growth of consumer credit in the United States:
Total Outstanding Consumer Installment Credit
(Excluding Real Estate Mortgage Credit)
End of World War I Less I
End of 1929
(44% is automobile paper)
End of 1956
(46% is automobile paper)
End of 1963
(41% is automobile paper)
Total Outstanding Consumer Credit
(Excluding Real Estate Mortgage Credit)
than $1,000,000,000
3,151,000,000
31,720,000,000
53,745,000,000
End of 1939 $ 7,222,000,000
End of 1956 42,334,000,000
End of 1963 69,890,000,000
B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 1 n.2 (1965).
2. Id. at 1-3. See also I FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
CONSUMEI4 INSTALLMENT CREDIT 22-24 (1957), cited in CURRAN, supra note 1, at 1;
Grattan, Buying on Time: Where Do You Stop?, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, April 1956, at 73;
Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839
(1959).
3. Usury has been defined as:
a. A loan of money or its equivalent or the forbearance of a debt owed.
b. An agreement between the parties that the principal shall be payable abso-
lutely.
c. Exaction of a greater amount of interest or profit than is allowed by law.
d. Intention to violate or evade the law at the inception of the transaction.
H. SIGMAN, USURY LAWS AND MODERN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 16 (1976). Most states
have enacted usury laws, and, as of 1975, all but four of fifty-three jurisdictions had
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common law time sales remained unregulated.4 A seller could charge one
established maximum rates on realty loans. T. WALL & C. ZWISLER, SURVEY OF STATE
USURY LAWS ii (1975). For a discussion of the application of usury laws to consumer
transactions, see note 4 infra.
One state judge expressed the judicial sensitivity to usurious transactions as follows:
Usury has long been recognized as a social and economic evil affecting not only
the parties to the transaction but society in general. Being widely regarded thus
and condemned by law as well, it is frequently hidden by legalistic devices and
cloaked in dissimulation.
Busk v. Hoard, 65 Wash. 2d 126, 127, 396 P.2d 171, 171 (1964).
4. The common law's refusal to subject time sales to the usury statutes is one of the
more curious developments in legal history. In the earliest case on point, plaintiff claimed
a land sale was at a usurious rate of interest. The court held: "The agreement was founded
partly upon what was considered the present price of the estate, and partly upon what was
considered its price if paid for at a future day." Beete v. Bidgood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792, 794
(K.B. 1827). American courts adopted this rule in Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (I Black) 115
(1861). Courts approved the time-price doctrine because most purchasers under time-sale
contracts were substantial landowners who did not need the protection from usury. See
generally 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 246. The following exemplifies judicial refusal to subject
time-sales to usury regulation:
The reason [that an installment sale cannot be usurious] is that the statute against
usury is striking at and forbidding the exaction or receipt of more than a specified
legal rate for the hire of money and not of anything else; and a purchaser is not
like the needy borrower, a victim of a rapacious lender, since he can refrain from
the purchase if he does not choose to pay the price asked by the seller.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 78, 262 S.W. 425, 428
(1924) (emphasis in original).
Unfortunately, courts extended the time-price doctrine beyond its original context of
land sales and applied it to consumer credit contracts and to purchasers who needed
protection from usury. This application of the doctrine allowed the pre-usury regulation
problems of debtors to reappear and harass purchasers under consumer time-sale
contracts. See B. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 2. Consequently, courts developed a number
of exceptions to the doctrine. See Warren, supra note 2, at 843-51. One early critic
attacked the time-price doctrine's exemption from usury regulation in the following terms:
Interest is compensation for the use of money lent. Whatever thing of benefit
comes to the lender as compensation for the use of money is interest, no matter
what name it may be given or what expedients may be adopted to conceal the fact
that the benefit received is, in essence, compensation for the use of the money.
No matter how remote a collateral transaction may seem to be, no matter how
shrewdly it is made to appear that a payment to the lender is for something else,
if the facts, taken together and read in the light of human experience, justify a
natural inference that the lender received the benefit because the borrower had
the use of his money and as compensation for the use, the benefit is intetest.
F. HUBACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAWS 146-47 (1938).
Even in the face of strong criticism, the time-price doctrine is still in effect in many
jurisdictions, at least when the consumer executes a promissory note for the purchase
price. See, e.g., Mandelino v. Fribourg, 23 N.Y.2d 145,242 N.E.2d 823, 295 N.Y.S.2d 654
(1968); Kidd v. J. Walter Bros., 212 Va. 197, 183 S.E.2d 140 (1971). The doctrine also
applied if the purchaser was offered a choice of two prices at the time of purchase.
McNish v. General Credit Corp., 164 Neb. 526, 537, 83 N.W.2d 1, 9-10 (1957), overruled
on othergrounds, Abel v. Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 936-37, 104 N.W.2d 684, 692 (1960). But
see Ferguson v. Tanner Dev. Co., 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). Many state
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price for cash sales and a higher price for time sales at common law5
because the difference in the two prices, the time-price differential,
theoretically resulted from bargaining and risk allocation between two
essentially equal parties. 6
The increased popularity of the installment contract undermined the
validity of the time sale's exemption from usury regulation, and some
states during the early 1940s began to regulate the amount of the time-
price differential.7 Most consumer credit regulation however, assumes
that consumer behavior is intelligently based on available credit informa-
tion8 and therefore simply requires full disclosure of all credit terms. 9
statutes treat the time-piece doctrine inconsistently. In Texas, for example, the usury
statute exempts the time-price differential from the interest figure. TEX. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 5069-1.01(a) (Vernon). On the other hand, Texas installment contract disclosure legisla-
tion requires disclosure of the time-price differential. TEX. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 5069-
6.02(g) (Vernon).
5. See note 4 supra.
6. B. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 2.
7. The expansion of the automobile industry in the 1920s sparked the growth of
consumer credit in the United States, and Indiana responded by passing the first retail
installment sales act in 1935, which imposed limits on the amount of the time-price
differential. B. CURRAN, supra note 1, at 2. However, "retail installment sales contracts
remained virtually unregulated in most states until the 1950s." Id. By 1950, only ten states
had enacted retail installment legislation. Id.
Experts soon realized that lenders must be allowed to charge higher rates before they
would make the smaller, riskier consumer loans. The Russell Sage Foundation drafted the
UNIFORM SMALL LOAN LAW (1916) prior to the adoption of state small loan laws to protect
consumers needing small loans from unscrupulous lenders. See generally I BOARD OF
GOVERNORS, supra note 2, at 22-24; F. HUBACHEK, supra note 4.
8. See 54 TEX. L. REv. 652, 653 n.6 (1976). This is the fundamental assumption of the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-66 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Congres-
sional intent to require full disclosure of credit terms is illustrated by the House report on
TILA:
Title I, the truth in lending and credit advertising title, neither regulates the
credit industry, nor does it impose ceilings on credit charges. It provides for full
disclosure of credit charges, rather than regulation of the terms and conditions
under which credit may be extended. It is the view of your committee that such
full disclosure would aid the consumer in deciding for himself the reasonableness
of the credit charges imposed and further permit the consumer to "comparison
shop" for credit. It is your committee's view that full disclosure of the terms and
conditions of credit charges will encourage a wiser and more judicious use of
consumer credit.
H.R. REP. No. 1040, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1962, 1963.
After examining empirical evidence of consumer behavior, researchers have criticized
the effectiveness of full disclosure regulation. See F. JUSTER, ANTICIPATIONS AND PUR-
CHASES: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR (1964); Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of
FInance Charges: A Rationale, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1320-22 (1966); Kripke, Consumer
Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 445 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Consumer Credit]; Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit
Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Gesture and Reality]; Note,Washington University Open Scholarship
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Thus, the Truth in Lending Act's (TILA)"° stated purpose is to enhance
economic stabilization and competition among financial institutions by
requiring the meaningful disclosure of credit terms to consumers. 
The most important TILA disclosure is the finance charge, 12 or the
actual monetary credit cost, expressed as an annual percentage rate. 3 In
Consumer Legislation and the Poor, 76 YALE L.J. 745 (1967). Professor Kripke argued
that disclosure legislation has no impact on the behavior of impoverished consumers and
that upper and middle income consumers had already driven high cost creditors out of the
market before the enactment of TILA. See Gesture and Reality, supra, at 3-9. But see
Whitford, The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer Transactions, 1973 Wis.
L. REV. 400.
9. See Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161,1163 (7th Cir. 1974); 54
TEX. L. REV. 652, 653 (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-66 (1970 & Supp V 1975), as amended by State Taxation of
Depositories Act, Pub. L. No. 94-222, § 3, 90 Stat. 197 (1976) & Consumer Leasing Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257.
11. The Congressional purpose is stated as follows:
The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the
competition among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in
the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of
credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof
by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of
credit.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970). TILA was finally enacted in 1968 after seven years of resistance
from the consumer credit industry. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
12. The finance charge "shall be determined as the sum of all charges, payable
directly or indirectly by the person to whom credit is extended, and imposed directly or
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to the extension of credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1605
(1970). The finance charge includes the following charges:
(1) Interest, time price differential, and any amount payable under a discount or
other system of additional charges.
(2) Service, transaction, activity, or carrying charge.
(3) Loan fee, points, finder's fee, or similar charge.
(4) Fee for an appraisal, investigation, or credit report.
(5) Charges or premiums for [some] credit life, accident, health, or loss of
income insurance ....
(6) Charges or premiums for [some] property insurance.
(7) Premium or other charge for any other guarantee or insurance protecting the
creditor against the customer's default . ...
(8) Any charge imposed by a creditor upon another creditor for purchasing or
accepting an obligation of a customer if the customer is required to pay any
part of that charge in cash, as an addition to the obligation, or as a deduction
from the proceeds of the obligation.
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a) (1977).
13. The finance charge expressed as an annual percentage rate must be "calculated
according to the actuarial method." 15 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(1)(A) (1970). For a discussion of
this method, see notes 35-36 infra and accompanying text. The statute allows the
disclosed annual percentage rate to vary by 1/4% from the actuarial rate. 15 U.S.C. §
1606(c) (1970).
[Vol. 1978:141
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a precomputed 14 installment contract the finance charge includes the total
interest to be earned over the life of the loan.15 When the lender acceler-
ates,16 or the borrower prepays the contract, a portion of the finance
charge will be unearned and must be rebated to the borrower. 17 The Rule
of 78's is a widely used method of computing rebates of unearned finance
charges due after premature termination by acceleration18 and voluntary
prepayment19 of precomputed installment contracts. 20 Rule of 78's re-
The finance charge, expressed as an annual percentage rate, includes many items that
creditors argued were not interest and, therefore, should not be expressed as percentages.
See, e.g., R. JOHNSON, METHODS OF STATING CONSUMER FINANCE CHARGES 90-96 (1961).
This argument assumes that only interest, and not other credit costs, can be meaningfully
expressed in percentage terms, but Congress under TILA clearly requires the entire
finance charge be expressed in percentage terms. See note 12, supra for discussion of
composition of finance charge.
14. For a discussion of precomputation, see note 29 infra and accompanying text.
15. See note 12, supra.
16. An acceleration provision in an installment contract provides that upon the pur-
chaser's failure to make timely payment, the entire amount is immediately due and
payable. W. ESTRICH, THE LAW OF INSTALLMENT SALES 21 (1926). The acceleration
provision may be either mandatory or optional with the creditor. Id. See also notes 88-91
infra and accompanying text.
17. See B. CURRAN, supra note I, at 167-69. Pennsylvania's motor vehicle statute is
typical of those requiring a refund of unearned finance charges:
Whenever all the time balance is liquidated prior to maturity by prepayment,
refinancing or termination by surrender or repossession and re-sale of the motor
vehicle, the holder of the installment sale contract shall rebate to the buyer
immediately the unearned portion of the finance charge. Rebate may be made in
cash or credited to the amount due on the obligation of the buyer.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 622(B) (Purdon 1965).
18. See notes 88-92 infra and accompanying text.
19. See note 20 infra and accompanying text. Creditors also use the Rule of 78's to
calculate rebates when contracts or loans are consolidated and refinanced. Hunt, The Rule
of 78: Hidden Penalty for Prepayment in Consumer Credit Transactions, 55 B.U. L. REV.
331, 332 (1975). By refinancing, the outstanding balance is extended over a longer period
of time, resulting in greater interest and finance charges. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
CODE § 2.504 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.C.]; Hunt, supra at 332. By consolidation, two
or more loans are added together and new finance charges are computed. See U.C.C.C. §
2.505; Hunt, supra at 332. Professor Hunt also cites In re Lowell, Nos. BK-70-1137/38
(S.D. Me. Nov. 20, 1972), in which the court used data indicating that 80% of all small
loan transactions involve refinancing or consolidation and that 50% involve four or more
consolidations. Hunt, supra at 333. If this data is correct, then the Rule of 78's is applied
in perhaps the majority of consumer credit transactions, providing a tremendous source of
income to creditors. The analysis of prepayment and acceleration rebates in this Note also
can be applied to rebates after refinancing and consolidation.
20. Professor Hunt noted that as of 1975, 47 states permitted creditors to compute
rebates of unearned finance charges by the Rule of 78's after voluntary prepayment.
Hunt, supra note 19, at 332. See also B. CURRAN, supra note I, at 288-92 (Chart 16);
Neifeld, The Rule of 78s-The Sum of the Digits Method for Computing Refunds, 13
PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. Rep. 8 (1958).
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bates are invariably smaller than actuarially determined rebates,2 and
consumers claim that the use of the Rule of 78's violates TILA and its
implementing 22 Regulation Z.23
This Note discusses the Rule of 78's disclosure problems under three
subections24 of Regulation Z that require disclosure of any penalties
resulting from the premature termination of an installment contract. It
argues that the Rule of 78's rebate differential,25 the difference between
the Rule of 78's rebate and the actuarial rebate, constitutes a penalty
which should be disclosed under TILA and Regulation Z.
II. PRECOMPUTATION AND THE RULE OF 78's
In order to understand the disclosure problems caused by premature
termination of a precomputed installment contract, one must understand
how an installment contract at simple interest is computed.26 Assume
XYZ Company agrees to lend A $1,000.00 at 12% simple interest. A
would receive $1,000.00 in exchange for a note with a face amount of
$1,000.00 that obligated A to pay $250.00 in principal each quarter plus
accrued interest. A's repayment schedule would be:
Repayment at 12% Simple Interest
Beginning Earned Ending
Quarter Principal Balance Payments Interest Principal Balance
1 1,000.00 280.00 30.00 750.00
2 750.00 272.50 22.50 500.00
3 500.00 265.00 15.00 250.00
4 250.00 257.50 7.50 0.00
21. See note 41 infra.
22. Congress delegated the following powers to the Federal Reserve Board:
The Board shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this sub-
chapter. These regulations may contain such classifications, differentiations, or
other provisions. . . as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper to
effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion
thereof, or to facilitate compliance therewith.
15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). Federal Reserve Board Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.15 (1977),
therefore has the force of law.
23. 12 C.F.R. 99 226.1-.15 (1977).
24. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4), (6), (7) (1977). See notes 55-57 infra and accompanying
text.
25. See notes 37-52 infra and accompanying text.
26. Simple interest is interest computed on the amount of the principal only. D. KiEso
& J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 216 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
ACCOUNTING]. It is "the return on (or growth of) the principal for one time period or for
each period in a succession of periods at a given rate per period applied to the principal at
the beginning of the series." Id. at 216-17.
[Vol. 1978:141
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As the principal balance declines, the accrued interest declines propor-
tionately, causing the inconvenience of unequal payments.
The use of compound rather than simple interest allows the borrower
to repay in equal installments. Therefore, A's payments would equal
$269.02 per quarter: 27
Repayment at 12% Compound Interest
Beginning Earned Ending
Quarter Principal Balance Payments Interest Principal Balance
1 1,000.00 269.02 30.00 760.98
2 760.98 269.02 22.82 514.78
3 514.78 269.02 15.44 261.20
4 261.20 269.02 7.82 0.00
By making equal payments under the compound interest schedule, A
pays less during the first two but more during the last two quarters than
he would pay under the simple interest schedule. The first quarter
compounded interest payment of $269.02 is $10.98 less than the first
quarter simple interest payment of $280.00. This difference represents
interest earned by XYZ that was not paid by A at the end of the first
quarter. Since A's payment is not large enough to cover both the $250.00
principal payment and the $30.00 earned interest payment, the $10.98
interest must be added to the ending principal balance. By increasing the
principal in this manner, XYZ can earn interest on interest-or
compound interest.28
27. The loan transaction described in the example is in the form of an annuity. An
annuity transaction is characterized by a lump sum cash receipt at the beginning of the
term followed by cash prepayments equal in amount and spaced evenly over time. In the
example, the face amount of the loan, $1,000.00, represents the annuity's lump sum cash
receipt. Assuming the lender and borrower agree to write the loan at a 12% annual rate of
interest, payable quarterly in equal payments, the lender must use the following equation
to determine the amount of each quarterly payment:
I 1
A (I +i)n
i
In the example, i=.03 and n=4; i represents the interest rate per repayment period (12%
annual rate divided by the four repayment periods), and n represents the number of
repayment periods. By solving for A, the lender calculates the present value of receiving
$1.00 at the end of each of four quarters, discounted at 12%; A represents the present
value per dollar of repayment amount. Because A multiplied by the repayment amount
equals the total present value of the annuity, and the total present value of the annuity
must equal the lump sum receipt (which, in this case, equals $1,000.00), the lender can
divide the lump sum cash receipt by A to arrive at his equal repayment amounts,
($1,000.00/A=$269.02). See ACCOUNTING, supra note 26, at 226.
28. Compound interest is
computed on principal and on any interest earned that has not been paid. It is the
return on (or growth of) the principal for two or more time periods, assuming that
Number 1]
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If A approached XYZ Company for a loan, the repayment terms
would probably not resemble either of the examples described above.
Instead, XYZ would precompute2 9 the loan contract, that is, calculate at
the beginning of the contract the total earned compounded interest as-
suming that payments will be made as due. This total interest figure,
representing the precomputed finance charge, is added to the principal to
arrive at the face amount of the loan. 30 The face amount is divided by the
number of payments to determine the amount of the equal periodic
payments.31 In the example, A would receive $1,000.00 in return for a
note with a face amount of $1,076.08 that obligated A to make equal
quarterly payments of $269.02. A's repayment schedule would be:
Repayment of Precomputed Loan Contract at 12%
Beginning Ending
Quarter Balance Due Payments Balance Due
1 1,076.08 269.02 807.06
2 807.06 269.02 538.04
3 538.04 269.02 269.02
4 269.02 269.02 0.00
The only significant difference between a compound interest loan and
a precomputed loan contract is that the compound interest method re-
quires allocation between principal and interest with every payment
whereas the allocation is unnecessary in a precomputed loan contract that
runs to maturity. If a precomputed contract is prematurely terminated,32
however, the shortened earning period causes a portion of the interest in
the precomputed finance charge to be unearned. Many state statutes
require lenders to rebate the unearned portion of the precomputed finance
the growth (the interest) in each time period is added to the principal at the end of
the period and earns a return in all subsequent periods. Compounding calculates
interest not only on the principal but also on the interest earned to date on that
principal.
AccoUNTING, supra note 26, at 217 (emphasis in original).
29. Although the consumer credit industry did not seriously advocate precomputation
until the 1950s, one author claimed that "we have been precomputing scheduled charges
ever since we started using flat payment schedules," in the 1930s. Redfield, Precomputa-
tion-Plain and Fancy, 12 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 4, 5 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Plain and Fancy]. See generally Harper, A Draftsman Looks at Precomputation, 12
PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 11 (1957); Kline, Precomputation from Standpoint of a
Personal Holding Company, Advertising and Customer Relations, 14 PERSONAL FINANCE
L.Q. REP. 65 (1960); Redfield, Why Precomputation?, 14 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP.
57 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Precomputation]; Wetzel, Earned Income Under Precompu-
tation, 12 PERSONAL FINANCE L.Q. REP. 7 (1957).
30. See Plain and Fancy, supra note 29, at 4.
31. Id.
32. The premature termination may be by acceleration, prepayment, consolidation, or
[Vol. 1978:141
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charge,33 and courts in states that have no statutory rebate requirement
hold that the creditor's claim for the entire precomputed contract balance
violates the usury statutes.M
This rebate may be computed according to the actuarial method or the
Rule of 78's. The actuarial method, involving a complicated translation
of the precomputed contract into the non-precomputed terms of a loan
contract at compound interest, 35 provides the only exact method of
computing the unearned interest included in the finance charge.36 As a
result, the exact amount of interest earned on the loan can be calculated,
and the difference between the earned and precomputed interest is re-
bated to the debtor.
The Rule of 78's, or the sum-of-the-digits method, is a simplified
method of computing unearned finance charge rebates. 37 The Rule uses a
fraction by which the total precomputed finance charge is multipled to
allocate properly between earned and unearned interest. 31 The de-
nominator of the fraction is determined by adding the digits representing
refinancing. Consolidation and refinancing are defined in note 19 supra. Acceleration is
defined in note 16 supra.
33. See note 17 supra.
34. Courts have been particularly sensitive to violations of the usury statutes which
often result from a creditor's claim for the entire amount of the precomputed finance
charge upon premature contract termination. See, e.g., Lawrimore v. Sun Fin. Co., 131
Ga. App. 96, 205 S.E.2d 110 (en banc), aff'd, 232 Ga. 637,208 S.E.2d 454 (1974); Lewis v.
Termplan, Inc., Bolton, 124 Ga. App. 507, 184 S.E.2d 473 (1971). State courts have
occasionally held that the creditor's mere demand for the entire contract balance including
precomputed finance charges is usurious, notwithstanding his intent to refund the un-
earned portion of the finance charge. See, e.g., Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d
209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975), noted at 54 TEx. L. REv. 652 (1976).
35. One of the disadvantages of the actuarial method for early proponents of the Rule
of 78's was the substantial mathematical calculations required for this translation. Plain
and Fancy, supra note 29, at 4; Precomputation, supra note 29, at 58. The argument has
lost its force, however, with the introduction of computers to the credit industry. See note
141 infra and accompanying text.
36. See FINANCIAL PUBLISHING COMPANY, FINANCIAL RATE TRANSLATOR 3 (1969); R.
JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 105-19; Hunt, supra note 19, at 332. In 1839 the Supreme
Court expressly sanctioned the use of the actuarial method, or U.S. Rule, as the
proper method:
The correct rule in general is, that the creditor shall calculate interest whenever a
payment is made. To this interest the payment is first to be applied; and if it
exceed the interest due, the balance is to be applied to diminish the principal. If
the payment falls short of the interest, the balance of interest is not to be added
to the principal so as to produce interest.
Story v. Livingston, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 359, 371 (1839).
37. For a thorough explanation of the Rule of 78's, see Hunt, supra note 19.
38. Id. at 333-60.
Number I1]
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the numbers of the payment periods. 39 Thus, in a 12-month contract, the
denominator is the sum of the digits 1 through 12, or 78, and in a four-
quarter contract the denominator is the sum of the digits 1 through 4, or
10. The numerator of the fraction is determined by adding the digits
representing the payment periods which are vitiated by prepayment.4 °
Thus in a 12 month loan, the amount of the unpaid principal balance
during the first month is approximately 12/78ths of the sum of the
monthly principal balances for the year. Similarly, the unpaid principal
balance for the first quarter of a four quarter loan is 4/10ths of the sum of
the quarterly principal balances for the year. This ratio also approximates
the percent of earned interest on the loan at the end of each period. Thus,
if the contract is prepaid in full at the end of the second quarter of a four
quarter contract, the numerator is 4 plus 3, or 7. Because 7/10ths of the
precomputed interest is earned, or $53.26, the rebate would be $22.82.41
Although A pays $53.26 in finance charges under the Rule of 78's, he
would pay $52.82 under the actuarial method, a difference of $.43.42
Proponents of the Rule of 78's concluded from such examples that the
Rule closely approximates the actuarial rebate.4 3
39. Id. at 334.
40. Id. at 334-35.
41. Neifield, supra note 20, at 8. The following tables illustrate the operation of the
Rule of 78's in the preceding example:
Table I
Rebates of Unearned Finance Charges by Rule of 78's
Prepayment Allocation by Rule of 78's Rule of 78's Rebate
During
Ist Quarter 4/10 x $76.08 = 30.43 76.08-30.43 = $ 45.65
2nd Quarter 7/10 x 76.08 = 53.26 76.08-53.26 = 22.82
3rd Quarter 9/10 x 76.08 = 68.48 76.08-68.48 = 7.60
4th Quarter 10/10 x 76.08 = 76.08 76.08-76.08 = 0.00
Table 2
Rebates of Unearned Finance Charges by Actuarial Method
Prepayment Actuarial Interest Actuarial Rebate
During Allocation
Ist Quarter 30.00 76.08-30.00 = $46.08
2nd Quarter 52.82 76.08-52.82 = 23.26
3rd Quarter 68.26 76.08-68.26 = 7.82
4th Quarter 76.08 76.08-76.08 = 0.00
Note that the allocations by the Rule of 78's are larger than those by the actuarial method.
Thus, the rebate of unearned finance charges is always smaller when computed by the
Rule of 78's.
42. See note 41 supra.
43. See, e.g., Bone v. Hibernia Bank, 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974); Consumer Credit,
supra note 8, at 455; Comment, Rule of 78's and the Required Disclosures Under Regula-
tion Z, 23 KAN. L. REV. 709, 713 (1975).
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Statutes in most states authorize creditors to determine the finance
charge rebates under the Rule of 78's.4 Although aware that the rebate
computed by the Rule of 78's was consistently lower than that computed
actuarially, creditors and commentators considered the resulting higher
yields insignificant.45 Proponents claimed that the use of precomputation
and the Rule of 78's led to improved customer relations, better operating
procedures, and improved income. 46
Subsequent scrutiny of the Rule of 78's revealed its potential for
severe inaccuracy in calculating rebates of unearned interest charges
when compared with the actuarial method.47 Although the actuarially
determined rebate in our example was only $.43 higher than that cal-
culated by the Rule of 78's,48 the Rule of 78's rebate differential in-
creases dramatically as the length of the loan contract 49 and rate of annual
interest increase.5 0 Additionally, graduated interest rates, allowed by
many state statutes, significantly increase the rebate differential. 1 Thus,
the rebate computed by the Rule of 78's on a twelve-year, $10,000.00
loan at twelve percent interest prepaid in the fifty-second month is
$555.91 less than the actuarially determined rebate.52 Surely the TILA
policy of disclosure of credit costs mandates greater judicial sensitivity to
44. See note 20 supra.
45. See, e.g., Consumer Credit, supra note 8, at 455; Plain and Fancy, supra note 29,
at 6.
46. E.g., Precomputation, supra note 29, at 57.
47. Scott v. Liberty Fin. Co., 380 F. Supp. 475,479 (D. Neb. 1974). See also notes 49-
52 infra and accompanying text.
48. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
49. Maximum Error in Rule of 78 as a
Percentage of Actuarial Refund
Terms of Indebtedness in Months 12% 24% 36%
24 7.25% 13.55% 19.16%
36 10.69 19.52 26.97
60 17.02 29.67 39.36
84 22.67 37.90 48.60
120 30.07 47.57 58.86
144 34.39 52.68 63.45
Hunt, supra note 19, at 344-45.
50. See note 49 supra.
51. Hunt, supra note 19, at 340, 349. Professor Hunt noted that some of the discre-
pancy between the actuarial rebate and the Rule of 78's rebate in a state with graduated
interest rates is due not to the Rule of 78's, but to the peculiar qualities of graduated
interest rates themselves. He stated that
[a]lthough authorization to precompute and use of the Rule of 78 in a graduated
rate transaction favors the creditor, authority to precompute and use the actua-
rial method to determine refunds of unearned finance charges would also be
advantageous to the creditor, although to a lesser extent.
52. See 42 Fed. Reg. 45,305 (1977) (to be codified in 24 C.F.R. §§ 201.501, .540, .585,
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a procedure which can increase the cost of consumer credit so dramat-
ically.
H. REBATE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE
TRUTH IN LENDING Acr
The primary purpose of the TILA is to require meaningful disclosure
of credit terms to enable consumers to compare effectively the offers of
their potential lenders.53 One term particularly relevant to a concerned
borrower is the amount of the rebate he will receive after acceleration or
prepayment of the loan. As noted above,' the Rule of 78's is often used
to compute this rebate when the loan is prematurely terminated. Consum-
ers have contended that three subsections of Regulation Z, section
226.8(b), require disclosure of acceleration and prepayment terms, in-
cluding the Rule of 78's rebate differential. Subsection 226.8(b)(4) 55
requires the lender to disclose the amount, or method of computing the
amount, of charges in the event of late payments. Under subsection
226.8(b)(6), 56 the lender must disclose the prepayment penalty charge
and describe the method of computing the penalty. Finally, subsection
226.8(b)(7)57 requires the lender to identify the method of computing
unearned finance charges, in the case of precomputation, and the amount
or method of computing any deductions from the rebate of the unearned
finance charge to the consumer.
.680). Because of the degree of error in the Rule of 78's, HUD has prohibited its use to
compute rebates on home improvement and mobile home loans. The only acceptable
method for this purpose is the actuarial method. Id. See also notes 145-48 infra and
accompanying text.
53. See the Congressional declaration of purpose at note 11 supra.
54. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
55. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(4) (1977) requires disclosure of "[t]he amount, or method of
computing the amount, of any default, delinquency, or similar charges payable in the
event of late payments."
56. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(6) (1977) requires:
A description of any penalty charge that may be imposed by the creditor or his
assignee for prepayment of the principal of the obligation (such as a real estate
mortgage) with an explanation of the method of computation of such penalty and
the conditions under which it may be imposed.
57. 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1977) requires:
Identification of the method of computing any unearned portion of the finance
charge in the event of prepayment in full of an obligation which includes precom.
puted finance charges and a statement of the amount or method of computation
of any charge that may be deducted from the amount of any rebate of such
unearned finance charge that will be credited to an obligation or refunded to the
customer. If the credit contract does not provide for any rebate of unearned
finance charges upon prepayment in full, this fact shall be disclosed.
[Vol. 1978:141
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss1/9
ACCELERATION AND PREPAYMENT DISCLOSURES
A. Prepayment Disclosures Under Subsections 226.8(b)(6) and
226. 8(b)(7)
Plaintiffs have challenged the lender's failure to disclose the use of the
Rule of 78's on several theories. In Bone v. Hibernia Bank (Bone I),58
the creditor merely disclosed that a prepayment rebate would be deter-
mined by the Rule of 78's. The court held that, under subsection
226.8(b)(7), mere reference by name to the Rule of 78's is insufficient
identification of the method of computing the unearned portion of the
finance charge.5 9 Other courts, relying on the express congressional
purpose of the TILA, have similarly held that mere reference by name to
the Rule of 78's is not a "meaningful disclosure" under subsection
226.8(b)(7). ° Plaintiffs have also successfully argued that unearned
finance charges not rebated to the borrower because of the inaccuracy of
the Rule of 78's represent a prepayment penalty under subsection
226.8(b)(6). 6 1 In Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc. ,62 the court
held that mere reference by name to the Rule of 78's is not a sufficient
description or explanation of the method of computing the prepayment
penalty charge as required by subsection 226.8(b)(6). Other cases
focused on the effect of the difference between the Rule of 78's rebate
and the actuarial rebate: when added to the earned portion of the finance
charge, the unearned finance charge increases the actual annual percent-
age rate beyond the disclosed percentage rate.
63
58. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) ' 99,025 (N.D. Cal. 1972), rev'd, 493 F.2d 135 (9th
Cir. 1974).
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Johnson v. Associates Fin. Inc., 369 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. I11. 1974);
Richardson v. Time Premium Co., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) f 99,272 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
61. See, e.g., Evans v. Household Fin. Corp., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,678
(S.D. Iowa, 1974); Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa
1972), rev'd in part on rehearing, 376 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1974). Cf. Scott v. Liberty
Fin. Co., 380 F. Supp. 475 (D. Neb. 1974) (Rule of 78's rebate differential is a prepayment
penalty under subsection 226.8(b)(7) but not under subsection 226.8(b)(6)).
62. 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972), rev'd in part on rehearing, 376 F. Supp. 852
(N.D. Iowa 1974).
63. This argument is based on 15 U.S.C. § 1606(c) (1970) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(b)(1)
(1977), which require the annual percentage rate to be rounded to the nearest quarter of
one percent. The validity of the argument depends, however, on inclusion of the Rule of
78's rebate differential in the finance charge from which the annual percentage rate is
calculated. A majority of district courts find the argument unpersuasive. See, e.g.,
Hamilton v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,804 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
The usual reason for rejecting it is that 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(g) (1977) vitiates the effect of
inaccuracies caused by occurrences subsequent to delivery of the required disclosures.
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The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) responded to these decisions in
1974 by issuing an official interpretation of subsections 226.8(b)(6) and
226.8(b)(7).1 4 The FRB stated that subsection 226.8(b)(6) applies only to
non-precomputed contracts, and not to rebate disclosure actions. 65 Under
this interpretation, consumers can no longer argue, as in Kenney, that a
lender's use of the Rule of 78's without explaining its method of compu-
tation imposes a prepayment penalty requiring disclosure under subsec-
tion 226.8(b)(6). Secondly, the FRB stated that subsection 226.8(b)(7)
only requires the identification of the rebate method used on precom-
puted contracts even though the statute refers specifically to the method
of calculating unearned finance charges, and that this "requirement of
rebate 'identification' is satisfied simply by reference by name to the
'Rule of 78's' or other method, as applicable." 66 The FRB reasoned that
a proper explanation of the Rule of 78's involves complex mathematical
See, e.g., Burrell v. City Dodge, Inc., 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,764 (N.D. Ga.
1974). The Rule of 78's rebate differential defies inclusion in the finance charge because
the differential amount is not determined until the contract is prepaid. The subsequent
occurrence argument therefore disposes of the finance charge issue. The other subsection
226.8(b)(7) and 226.8(b)(4) arguments, discussed in notes 58-115 infra and accompanying
text, are unaffected by the subsequent occurrence argument. Practically all of the disclo-
sures required by 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1977) involve occurrences subsequent to disclosure.
64. 12 C.F.R. § 226.818 (1977) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Section 226.8(b)(6) relates only to charges assessed in connection with
obligations which do not involve precomputed finance charges included in the
obligation. It applies to transactions in which the finance charge is computed
from time to time by application of a rate to the unpaid principal balance.
Prepayment penalties which require disclosure under this section (which princi-
pally arise in connection with prepayment of real estate mortgages) occur when
the obligor in such a transaction is required to pay separately an additional
amount for paying all or part of the obligation before maturity. On the other
hand, § 226.8(b)(7) is designed to encompass the disclosures necessary with
regard to the prepayment of an obligation involving precomputed finance charges
which are included in the face amount of the obligation. Therefore, although in a
precomputed obligation the finance charge rebate to a customer may be less
when calculated according to the "Rule of 78's," "sum of the digits," or other
method than if calculated by the actuarial method, such difference does not
constitute a penalty charge for prepayment that must be described pursuant to §
226.8(b)(6).
(c) Section 226.8(b)(7) requires "identification" of the rebate method used on
precomputed contracts. Many State statutes provide for rebates of unearned
finance charges under methods known as the "Rule of 78's" or "sum of the
digits" or other methods. In view of the fact that such statutory provisions
involve complex mathematical descriptions which generally cannot be condens-
ed into simple accurate statements, and which if repeated at length on disclosure
forms could detract from other important disclosures, the requirement of rebate
"identification" is satisfied simply by reference by name to the "Rule of 78's"
or other method, as applicable.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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descriptions which, "if repeated at length on disclosure forms, could
detract from other important disclosures." 67
The Ninth Circuit responded to the FRB's new interpretation by
reversing Bone I in Bone v. Hibernia Bank (Bone 11). 68 The court
believed that the Rule of 78's is accurate and closely approximates the
actuarial method.69 Secondly, it noted that the identification requirement
in subsection 226.8(b)(7) is less stringent than the description and expla-
nation requirements in subsection 226.8(b)(6), and is satisfied simply by
referring by name to the Rule of 78's.7° Thirdly, the court deferred to the
agency's expertise and gave presumptive effect to the new interpreta-
tion. 71 Finally, the court rejected the consumer's argument that the rebate
differential caused by the operation of the Rule of 78's creates an
unacceptable variation in the annual percentage rate.72
Other courts, however, rejected the FRB's new interpretation. 73 In
Scott v. Liberty Finance Co. 74 the debtor prepaid his precomputed note
and received a rebate determined by the Rule of 78's, which was
identified by name only in the disclosure statement. The district court
reasoned that because both subsections 226.8(b)(6) and 226.8(b)(7) re-
quire disclosure of prepayment penalties, they should be construed to-
gether. 75 Subsection 226.8(b)(7) requires two disclosures: (1) identifica-
tion of the method used to determine unearned finance charges and, (2) a
statement of the amount or method of computing any charge which the
creditor will deduct from the unearned finance charge rebate.76 The
identification disclosure is only a preliminary step which has no indepen-
dent value to the consumer in comparing credit terms.77 A meaningful
67. Id.
68. 493 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1974).
69. Id. at 137.
70. Id. at 138.
71. Id. at 139-40.
72. Id. at 140-41. The court stated that "[otherwise, subsequent events such as late
payment charges, Christmas deferrals or prepayment of the obligation, would each require
a recomputation of the annual percentage rate. This result would be entirely unwieldy and
impractical." Id. at 141. See also note 63 supra.
73. See Scott v. Liberty Fin. Co., 380 F. Supp. 475 (D. Neb. 1975).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 477. Actually, nothing in the official interpretation, 12 C.F.R. § 226.818,
precludes this parallel construction. Restricting subsection 226.8(b)(6) to non-precom-
puted contracts does not logically preclude the finding of similar disclosure policies
underlying subsections 226.8(b)(6) and 226.8(b)(7).
76. 380 F. Supp. at 477-78.
77. Id. at 477.
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comparison of competing credit terms can only be made after the lender
discloses the amount that will be deducted from the unearned finance
charge rebate.7 8
The Scott court refused to accept the Rule of 78's as a method of
computing unearned finance charges, 79 and held that these charges may
be calculated only by using the actuarial method, or a close approxima-
tion thereof.80 The court, relying on subsection 226.5(b)(1), 8 t which
requires that the disclosed annual percentage rate be within one quarter
percent of the actual finance charge expressed as an annual percentage
rate, concluded that the Rule of 78's does not closely approximate the
actuarial method;8 2 rather, the Rule results in rebate errors that vary
between 1.3% and 27.6% of the correct actuarial rebate.8 3 Although the
creditor may have adequately disclosed the annual percentage rate of the
finance charge, the rebate differential caused by the Rule of 78's was
larger than the allowable percentage rate variation from the actual finance
charge under subsection 226.5(b)(1). 4
The Scott court also found a violation of the second required disclo-
sure under subsection 226.8(b)(7). The court rejected the FRB's official
interpretation which required that the creditor only disclose the rebate
method by name, 85 and held that subsection 226.8(b)(7) mandated dis-
78. Id.
79. The court stated:
It is readily apparent that the rule of 78's does not, in fact, compute unearned
finance charge and that if, upon prepayment of the obligation, the amount of the
rebate of unearned finance charge is based upon the rule of 78's, the rebate will
be less than the unearned finance charge. In other words, the rebate of unearned
finance charge based on the rule of 78's imposes a prepayment penalty on the
consumer.
Id. at 478.
80. After concluding that the Rule of 78's does not compute unearned finance
charges, the court indicated that it might accept the Rule of 78's if it, in fact, closely
approximated the actuarial method. Id. The Scott decision differs from Bone II, there-
fore, only in its conception of the degree of inaccuracy involved in use of the Rule of 78's.
81. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(b)(1) is the Regulation Z counterpart of 15 U.S.C. § 1606(c)
(1970). See also note 63 supra.
82. 380 F. Supp. at 478.
83. The court sua sponte drew up its own tables to demonstrate the inaccuracies of
the Rule of 78's. Id. at 480-81. These tables are similar to those at notes 41 & 49 supra. In
the transaction before the Scott court, prepayment in the first month caused a Rule of 78's
rebate 1.3% smaller than the actuarial rebate, while prepayment in the twenty-third month
caused a Rule of 78's rebate 27.6% smaller than the actuarial rebate. 380 F. Supp. at 481.
84. 380 F. Supp. at 479.
85. See note 64 supra.
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closure of the method of computing unearned finance charges. 86 Scott
refused to equate rebate with unearned finance charge, and held that the
Rule of 78's rebate differential is a prepayment penalty which the
creditor had not disclosed in violation of the second requirement of
subsection 226.8(b)(7). 87
Therefore, two views remain concerning the rebate disclosure require-
ment of subsection 226.8(b)(7) for voluntary prepayments. On the one
hand, Bone / and the FRB require only that the creditor refer to the Rule
of 78's by name. The Scott court, on the other hand, requires the creditor
to disclose the rebate differential if the Rule of 78's does not closely
approximate the actuarial method.
B. Acceleration Disclosure Under Subsections 226.8(b)(4) and
226.8(b)(7)
The disclosure problems caused by a creditor's acceleration of a
contract are closely related to those caused by prepayment. Most
consumer contracts contain a clause granting the creditor a right of
acceleration, that is, to declare the entire unpaid amount of the loan due
and payable immediately, upon the customer's default or delinquency. 88
Some accelerating creditors demand the principal plus accrued interest,
while others demand the entire unpaid balance of the note.89 If, despite
the acceleration, the debtor waits until the maturity date to pay the
balance of the contract, no unearned finance charges result from the
acceleration. 9° If the debtor pays an accelerated contract prior to its
maturity, however, some of the precomputed finance charges are unearn-
ed.91 Many state statutes permit creditors to use the Rule of 78's to
compute the rebates on loans prematurely paid after acceleration. 92 In
86. 380 F. Supp. at 477.
87. Id. at 479.
88. Martin v. Commercial Sec. Co., 539 F.2d 521, 524 (5th Cir. 1976).
89. Compare Martin v. Commercial Sec. Co., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976), with
Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975), and Thompson v.
Twin City Fin. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 924 (W.D. La. 1976).
90. If the debtor falls behind in his payment schedule, actual accrued interest may
exceed that which was precomputed.
91. See, e.g., Perry v. Liberty Consumer Discount Co., 433 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa.
1977); Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1976).
92. The Pennsylvania Banking Code is typical:
Rebate of unearned charges-In the event of payment or refinancing of the
balance of a loan prior to maturity the institution shall pay or credit a refund of
the unearned portion of the charge made pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section in an amount which shall be at least the amount computed, for the
unexpired period to the date of scheduled maturity, by the accounting method
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these states, the Rule of 78's presents acceleration disclosure problems
similar to those caused by applying the Rule to voluntary prepayments.
Courts and the FRB have taken five positions concerning the disclo-
sures required of an accelerating creditor. In Garza v. Chicago Health
Clubs, Inc.,93 an important early case, the court interpreted subsection
226.8(b)(4), which requires the disclosure of "default, delinquency, or
similar charges."94 Although the contract provided for acceleration, the
creditor had not disclosed this right in the disclosure statement. The
district court rejected plaintiff's argument that payment pursuant to
acceleration is essentially prepayment and thereby subject to disclosure
under subsections 226.8(b)(6) and 226.8(b)(7). 95 Nevertheless, the court
agreed with plaintiff's second argument and held that the creditor's right
to accelerate is a subsection 226.8(b)(4) "charge." ' 96 The Rule of 78's
rebate differential was not an issue in Garza because the court considered
only disclosure of the creditor's right to accelerate under subsection
226.8(b)(4). Although several federal courts agree with Garza,97 a great-
er number have not been persuaded by its reasoning. 98 Thus the Fifth
known as 'the sum of the digits' or 'the rule of 78' except that no such refund
shall be required in an amount less than one dollar ($1) or in any amount until the
institution has received a minimum charge of five dollars ($5) for the loan.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 309(g) (Purdon 1967).
93. 347 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
94. See note 55 supra.
95. 347 F. Supp. at 959. The court dealt with both subsections 226.8(b)(6) and
226.8(b)(7), because the FRB had not yet issued its official interpretation, 12 C.F.R. §
226.818, which confines subsection 226.8(b)(6) to non-precomputed contracts.
96. 347 F. Supp. at 959. The Ninth Circuit, in LaGrone v. Johnson, 534 F.2d 1360 (9th
Cir. 1976), apparently adopted a Garza approach to acceleration clauses. The Garza
acceleration clause called for automatic acceleration of the entire note upon default by the
customer. Courts have reached the Garza result in other fact situations. In Pugh v.
American Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,827 (D. Conn.
1974), the court required disclosure of an optional acceleration clause. See generally
Rumsey, Truth-in-Lending: Congress Reacts to the Creditors' Dilemma, 24 EMORY L.J.
379 (1975).
97. See Rivera v. Dick McFeely Pontiac, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 506 (N.D. 111. 1977)
(optional acceleration term imposes a "charge" in absence of acceleration rebate provi-
sions); Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co., 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1976) (acceleration is a
"charge"); Woods v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 395 F. Supp. 9 (D. Ore. 1975) ("meaningful
disclosure" requires acceleration to be disclosed); Pollock v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 5
CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,766 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (Recommendations of Special
Master) (acceleration is a "charge"); Pugh v. American Tractor Trailer Training, Inc., 5
CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 1 98,827 (D. Conn. 1974) (acceleration may effectively in-
crease cost of credit extended); Hall v. Sheraton Galleries, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH)
98,737 (N.D. Ga. 1974) (acceleration is a "charge," and its disclosure is essential to
"meaningful disclosure").
98. See Martin v. Commercial Sec. Co.,' 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976)1(acceleration of
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Circuit, in Martin v. Commercial Securities Co. ,I held that a creditor's
right to accelerate and demand the entire face amount of the note,
including unearned finance charges, is not a subsection 226.8(b)(4)
"charge" requiring disclosure. I°°
Although the Martin and Garza courts reach opposite results, they
agree that acceleration and prepayment do not represent analogous TILA
disclosure problems. The cases are also similar in their analytical focus
on the right of acceleration, rather than on the potential impact of this
right on the cost of credit to the customer. 101
The FRB and the courts in Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford,
Inc. 102 and Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co. 103 take intermediate positions
regarding disclosure of costs of acceleration. They recognize that accel-
eration and prepayment may similarly affect credit costs and attempt to
adjust the TILA disclosure requirements to the credit cost variations
caused by acceleration. The FRB stated in Staff Opinion Letter No.
851,104 that the accelerating creditor imposed no subsection 226.8(b)(4)
"charge" so long as he rebated unearned finance charges using the
entire balance, including unearned finance charges, need not be disclosed.); Grant v.
Imperial Motors, 539 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1976) (accord with Martin); Johnson v. McCrack-
in-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975) (acceleration need not be disclosed if
creditor required by state law to refund unearned finance charges); Ecenrode v. House-
hold Fin. Corp., 422 F. Supp. 1327 (D. Del. 1976) (acceleration is not a "charge" as long
as creditor computes acceleration rebate by same method as voluntary prepayment
rebates under 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(b)(7) (1977)); St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 413 F.
Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1976) (acceleration is an optional "subsequent occurrence" and
need not be disclosed); Morris v. First Nat'l Bank, 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 98,568
(N.D. Ga. 1975) (acceleration is not a "charge," and annual percentage rate variation
provision not violated because acceleration is a "subsequent occurrence").
99. 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976). But see Rivera v. Dick McFeely Pontiac, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 506 (N.D. 11. 1977); cf. Ecenrode v. Household Fin. Corp., 422 F. Supp. 1327 (D.
Del. 1976) (failure to disclose acceleration term when unearned finance charges are not to
be rebated states a claim upon which relief may be granted).
100. The Tenth Circuit followed Martin in Begay v. Ziems Motor Co., 550 F.2d 1244
(10th Cir. 1977).
101. Although the issue of whether the acceleration clause should itself be disclosed is
an important one, the focus of this Note is on the narrower issue of whether the Rule of
78's rebate differential produced by premature payment after acceleration should be
disclosed under TILA. For the most recent discussions of the former issue, see Comment,
Acceleration Clause Disclosure Under the Truth in Lending Act, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 649
(1977), and Note, Truth in Lending-Failure to Disclose a Right of Acceleration Held Not
a Violation, 55 N.C.L. REV. 344 (1977).
102. 527 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1975).
103. 407 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. La. 1976).
104. 4 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,173 (Oct. 22, 1974), which reads in pertinent
part:
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method disclosed under the first part of subsection 226.8(b)(7) for volun-
tary prepayment. The FRB subsequently issued Official Staff Interpreta-
tion No. FC-0054,105 limiting the effect of Letter No. 851 to situations in
which premature payment was made pursuant to acceleration. The FRB
reasoned that such payment is "essentially the same" as a voluntary
prepayment under subsection 226.8(b)(6).10 6 Since the Rule of 78's
rebate differential is undisclosed under subsection 226.8(b)(7) for volun-
tary prepayment, it is similarly undisclosed under subsection 226.8(b)(4)
for prepayment after acceleration. 107
For the purposes of Truth in Lending disclosures, this staff views an accelera-
tion of payments as essentially a prepayment of the contract obligation. As such,
the disclosure provisions of § 226.8(b)(7) of the Regulation, which require the
creditor to identify the method of rebating any unearned portion of the finance
charge or to disclose that no rebate would be made, apply. If the creditor rebates
under one method for acceleration and another for voluntary prepayment, both
methods would need to be identified under § 226.8(b)(7). Failure to disclose the
method of rebate or nonrebate would be a violation of the Truth in Lending Act.
If, under the acceleration provision, a rebate is made by the creditor in
accordance with the disclosure of the rebate provisions of § 226.8(b)(7), we
believe that there is no additional "charge" for late payments made by the
customer and therefore no need to disclose under the provisions of § 226.8(b)(4).
On the other hand, if upon acceleration of the unpaid remainder of the total of
payments, the creditor does not rebate unearned finance charges in accordance
with the rebate provisions disclosed in § 226.8(b)(7), any amounts retained
beyond those which would have been rebated under the disclosed rebate provi-
sions represent a "charge" which should be disclosed under § 226.8(b)(4).
Id.
105. 5 CONS. CRED. GUIDE (CCH) 31,552 (Mar. 21, 1977).
You ask whether a creditor's right of acceleration upon default by the obligor
must be disclosed as a default, delinquency, or late payment charge within the
context of § 226.8(b)(4). It is the staff's opinion that the phrase "default,
delinquency, or similar charges in the event of late payments," [sic] found in §
128(a)(9) and § 129(a)(7) of the Truth in Lending Act and § 226.8(b)(4) of
Regulation Z, refers to specific sums assessed against a borrower solely because
of failure to make payments when due. It is staff's opinion that the mere right to
accelerate contained in a contractual provision which sets out the creditor's right
to accelerate the entire obligation upon a certain event (generally the obligor's
failure to make a payment when due) is not a charge payable in the event of late
payment. Therefore, it need not be disclosed under § 226.8(b)(4).
You refer to a prior Public Information Letter, No. 851, which discusses the
right of acceleration. Staff believes that letter addresses a different issue than the
one posed in your letter. Staff understands that letter to say that early payment
of the balance of a precomputed finance charge obligation by a customer upon
acceleration by the creditor is essentially the same as a prepayment of the
obligation. Therefore, if the creditor does not rebate unearned finance charges in
accordance with the rebate provisions disclosed under § 226.8(b)(7) when the
customer pays the balance of the obligation upon acceleration, any amounts
retained beyond those which would have been rebated under the disclosed rebate
provisions do represent the type of charge that must be disclosed under §
226.8(b)(4).
Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
[Vol. 1978:141
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss1/9
Number 1] ACCELERATION AND PREPAYMENT DISCLOSURES 161
The Third Circuit, in Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford Inc.,
adopted a position similar to the FRB and held that the accelerating
creditor did not impose any subsection 226.8(b)(4) "charges" on the
debtor as long as state law required him to refund the unearned finance
charges. 0 8 The Johnson court noted, however, that it would have found
a subsection 226.8(b)(4) "charge" if the borrower had been required to
pay any amounts in addition to the unpaid principal.' °9 If the Third
Circuit had scrutinized Pennsylvania law more closely, it would have
discovered that a state statute authorized use of the Rule of 78's to
compute unearned finance charge rebates. 110 It is logical to conclude that
the Third Circuit would have found a subsection 226.8(b)(4) "charge" in
the amount of the rebate differential if it had understood the inaccuracy of
the Rule of 78's.
Finally, the district court in Burley v. Bastrop Loan Co. held that an
accelerating creditor imposed a subsection 226.8(b)(4) "charge" on the
customer in the amount of the Rule of 78's rebate differential, even
though a state law authorized use of the Rule of 78's for computing
unearned finance charge rebates. 11 The Burley court, relying heavily on
Scott's analysis of the Rule of 78's,12 held that under certain circum-
stances acceleration and prepayment present similar TILA disclosure
problems," 3 and that the Rule of 78's rebate differential is an added
credit cost which must be disclosed under subsections 226.8(b)(4) and
108. 527 F.2d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 1975).
109. The court stated:
[AII the borrower need pay upon acceleration is the unpaid portion of the
principal obligation ' . . . If McCrackin-Sturman had exercised its right to
accelerate payment, it would have been required under Pennsylvania law to
rebate immediately to plaintiffs the entire unearned portion of the finance
charge. Plaintiffs would have been obligated to pay only the-unpaid principal.
Id. at 265 (footnotes omitted).
110. The applicable Pennsylvania statute provides:
The unearned finance charge to be rebated to the buyer shall represent at least
as great a proportion of the total finance charge as the sum of the periodical time
balances after the date of prepayment bears to the sum of all the periodical time
balances under the schedule of payments in the original agreement: Provided,
however, the holder shall not be required to rebate any portion of such unearned
finance charge which results in a net minimum finance charge on the contract
less than ten dollars ($10.00); And provided further, the holder shall not be
required to rebate any unearned finance charge when the amount due, computed
as herein set forth, is less than one dollar ($1.00).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 622(C) (Purdon 1965).
111. 407 F. Supp. 773, 781 (W.D. La. 1976).
112. See notes 74-87 supra and accompanying text.
113. The view that acceleration and prepayment raise related TILA issues is not shared
by all courts. In Martin v. Commercial Sec. Co., 539 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth
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(7).114 Although the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Martin has effectively
overruled Burley,115 the case merits discussion as a viable and persuasive
alternative.
IV. ANALYSIS
Although there are legal and conceptual differences between accelera-
tion and prepayment, premature payment of a loan pursuant to accelera-
tion imposes an added credit cost on the borrower similar to that of
prepayment if the creditor computes the rebate according to the Rule of
78's.1 16 The several intermediate acceleration positions noted above 117
recognize that acceleration may result in an added cost of credit to the
customer. The FRB and the Johnson and Burley courts disagree, how-
ever, over how to treat the Rule of 78's rebate differential. 18 The FRB
approach to acceleration, consistent with its treatment of prepayment,
does not require disclosure of the rebate differential.'1 9 The Burley court,
on the other hand, followed the Scott analysis for disclosure of the
prepayment rebate differential and requires subsection 226.8(b)(4) dis-
closure of this rebate differential. 2 ' The Johnson court recognized the
Circuit rejected both FRB Opinion Letter No. 851 and Interpretation FC-0054 because
of their similar treatment of voluntary prepayment under subsection 226.8(b)(7) and pre-
payment pursuant to acceleration under subsection 226.8(b)(4). The court stated:
[W]e. . . can not accept the [FRB] staff's interpretation of. . . 226.8(b)(4) and
226.8(b)(7). With deference, we find its one-sentence conclusion that an acceler-
ation of payments is essentially a prepayment of the contract obligation to be an
analytical construction of regulatory intent which has not been expressed in
language that "all who run may read." In the installment credit context prepay-
ment and acceleration appear to be conceptually antithetical. The former is the
unilateral act of the debtor; the latter the unilateral act of the creditor in the
typical installment contract.
Id. at 529 (footnote omitted). But see Chapman v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank,
46 U.S.L.W. 2399 (D.R.I. Feb. 7, 1978); Begay v. Ziems Motor Co., 550 F.2d 1244, 1249
(10th Cir. 1977) (Holloway, J., dissenting).
114. 407 F. Supp. at 781.
115. By holding that the acceleration term need not be disclosed despite the creditor's
claim for unearned finance charges, the Fifth Circuit has a fortiori foreclosed the argu-
ment that the Rule of 78's rebate differential should be disclosed. Martin is arguably
inconsistent with the clearly expressed congressional intent to require full disclosure of
credit costs to consumers. See notes 8 & 11 supra and accompanying text.
116. Similar problems arise in refinancing and loan consolidation because creditors use
the Rule of 78's to compute unearned finance charge rebates in these situations as well.
See note 19 supra.
117. See notes 102-14 supra and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. See notes 64-67, 104-07 supra and accompanying text.
120. See notes 111-15 supra and accompanying text.
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need to disclose additional credit costs, but failed to appreciate that the
Rule resulted in added cost. 2 '
The Rule of 78's rebate differential is also the critical point of disa-
greement among courts considering subsection 226.8(b)(7) voluntary pre-
payment disclosure problems. 2 2 The FRB and Johnson on the one hand
and Burley and Scott on the other disagree as to whether the Rule of 78's
is an acceptable subsection 226.8(b)(7) method of computing unearned
finance charges. Consideration of this question requires a closer analysis
of the district court's reasoning in Scott.
Scott's fundamental premise is that, for TILA disclosure purposes,
unearned finance charges may only be computed actuarially. 123 Although
the Scott court indicated it would accept a close approximation of the
actuarial method, it held that the Rule of 78's was not such a close
approximation in the case before it.'24 The Rule of 78's rebate differ-
ential, therefore, was a prepayment charge that had to be disclosed under
subsection 226.8(b)(7).125
One commentator argues that Scott fundamentally misinterprets sub-
section 226.8(b)(7) by misinterpreting the critical word "rebate" in the
second part of subsection 226.8(b)(7). 26 The word "rebate" qualifies
the words "unearned finance charge" such that the "rebate of . ..
unearned finance charge" is the amount to be refunded as computed by
the Rule of 78's. 127 Subsection 226.8(b)(7)'s disclosure requirement of
the amount of any charge deducted from the unearned finance charge is
triggered only if the creditor withholds an amount in addition to the
rebate as computed by the Rule of 78's. 128
This argument is attractive for several reasons. First, it is unclear why
the FRB would require "identification of the method of computing any
121. See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 58-87 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text.
125. See note 87 supra and accompanying text.
126. Comment, supra note 43, at 727.
127. Id.
128. This amount would be similar to an acquisition charge, which is either a fixed
amount or percentage charge by the creditor upon debtor's premature payment. The
purpose of such charges is to compensate the creditor for increased overhead caused by
prepayment. Acquisition charges are clearly within the purview of subsection 226.8(b)(7),
and the question this Note raises is whether the Rule of 78's rebate differential is
sufficiently similar to an acquisition charge to merit disclosure under subsection
226.8(b)(7).
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unearned portion of the finance charge" if the actuarial method is the
only one acceptable for subsection 226.8(b)(7) disclosure purposes.
Furthermore, subsection 226.8(b)(7)'s identification requirement 29 im-
plies that there is more than one method of computing the unearned
finance charge. Additionally, subsection 226.8(b)(7) requires "a state-
ment of the amount or method of computation of any charge that may be
deducted from the amount of any rebate of such unearned finance
charge." 130 This appears to be a response to a common practice by which
creditors retain a fixed amount or percentage in addition to the unearned
finance charge (however computed) upon premature contract termina-
tion.' 3I Finally, despite Scott's contrary assertions, 32 the FRB seems to
have contemplated nondisclosure when it promulgated subsection
226.8(b)(7) and its official interpretation. 133
The Scott interpretation of subsection 226.8(b)(7) can, however, be
defended on a number of grounds. First, TILA requires the cost of credit
to be expressed as an annual percentage rate computed by the actuarial
method.M Congress adopted the more exact actuarial method despite
creditor preference for the add-on, discount, and other simplified but
inaccurate methods of determining credit rates. 135 There is no reason why
subsection 226.8(b)(7) should be the only section of TILA or Regulation
Z to adopt a method of computing unearned finance charges other than
the actuarial method.
Secondly, TILA's policy of informing the consumer of his credit costs
arguably applies to any difference in cost caused by a creditor's use of a
particular method of determining rebates upon premature contract termi-
nation. 136 TILA's definition of finance charge includes many costs not
usually considered part of the finance charge. 137 Although the Rule of
78's rebate differential is not part of the finance charge, 138 it is clearly an
indirect cost to consumers and a source of income to creditors, which
should be disclosed in some manner. 139
129. See note 57 supra.
130. Id.
131. See note 128 supra.
132. 380 F. Supp. 475, 479 (D. Neb. 1974).
133. See notes 57, 64-67 supra and accompanying text.
134. See notes 12-13 supra.
135. See R. JOHNSON, supra note 13, at 103-18.
136. See note I 1 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
138. See notes 12 & 63 supra.
139. While the focus of this Note is on whether the Rule of 78's rebate differential
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Thirdly, the creditor's argument that the Rule of 78's rebate differ-
ential is compensation for otherwise lost income and increased overhead
caused by the premature contract termination should be rejected. The lost
income from premature contract termination is accounted for in establish-
ing interest rates and other forms of credit regulation."14 The "increased
overhead" argument is similarly without foundation because most fi-
nance companies and banks now use computers to calculate interest. 141
The simplicity of the Rule of 78's may have kept overhead low when
contracts were first precomputed by hand in the 1930s,' 42 but that
argument is presently without merit.
Finally, the degree of error in the Rule of 78's militates against its
acceptance as a method of computing unearned finance charges for
purposes of subsection 226.8(b)(7) and, by derivation, subsection
226.8(b)(4). 43 One study concluded that the Rule of 78's "simply breaks
down"144 in some situations. This breakdown should propel state legisla-
tures to consider whether more careful regulation of the Rule of 78's
rebate differential is necessary.
The Department of Housing and Urban Development recently re-
sponded to the inaccuracy in the Rule of 78's by prohibiting its use on
property improvement and mobile home loans. 145 HUD now requires that
the rebates on these loans be computed by the actuarial method, despite
its recognition that many state laws permit creditors to use the Rule of
78's. 146 HUD rejected the Rule because it is inaccurate and results in
higher costs to consumers.' 47 In addition, HUD noted that any loss of
should be disclosed under subsection 226.8(b(7) as an added credit cost, other problems
arise concerning the method of disclosure. Obviously, it is not clear at the time
of contract formation whether the contract will run to maturity. Thus, the creditor could
not possibly disclose the exact amount of the Rule of 78's rebate differential. A possible
solution to this problem is to require the creditor to disclose, for contracts above a certain
dollar amount, that the Rule of 78's rebate upon prepayment, acceleration, refinancing, or
consolidation will be smaller than the actuarial rebate. Certain maximum percentage
variations might also be relevant to the customer seeking to compare credit terms.
140. See note 148 infra and accompanying text.
141. See R. KOCHENBURGER & C. TURCiO, COMPUTERS IN MODERN SOCIETY 182
(1974); D. SPENCER, COMPUTERS IN SOCIETY 107-08 (1974).
142. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
144. FINANCIAL PUBLISHING CO., COST OF PERSONAL BORROWING IN THE UNITED
STATES 61 (1976).
145. 42 Fed. Reg. 45,305 (1977) (to be codified in 24 C.F.R. §§ 201.501, .540, .585,
.680).
146. Id.
147. Id.
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creditor income caused by prepayment is a factor considered in establish-
ing the initial interest charge for loans. 148
V. CONCLUSION
HUD's substantive prohibition of the Rule of 78's raises the issue of
whether the FRB should permit its use without at least requiring creditors
to disclose its vagaries and inaccuracies. The TILA is not a substantive
regulation; it is disclosure legislation, and no TILA plaintiffs have
attempted to prohibit the use of the Rule of 78's. The question, rather, is
whether the potentially large Rule of 78's rebate differential should be
exempt from disclosure, and therefore remain a substantial source of
undisclosed, indirect income to creditors.
Moreover, creditors themselves indicate the similarities of voluntary
prepayment and prepayment pursuant to acceleration by using the Rule of
78's to compute both kinds of rebates. Courts and the FRB should
therefore require disclosure of this differential in both situations. Finally,
state legislatures should prohibit the use of the Rule of 78's and, if
necessary, increase interest rates to compensate creditors for otherwise
lost income. This approach is consistent with the sound policy of pre-
venting undisclosed and indirect credit charges to consumers.
Timothy Ramsey
148. Id.
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